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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
RONNIE LEE CRIPPS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19140 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged by information with 
Distribution of A Controlled substance for value, Utah Code 
Ann.§ 58-37-8 (l)(a)(ii) (1953), as amended. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty 
of Distribution of a Controlled Substance for Value on 
February 25, 1983 in the Seventh Judicial District Court of 
Carbon County, State of Utah, the Honorable Boyd Bunnell 
presiding. on April 12, 1983, appellant was sentenced to an 
indeterminate term of confinement in the Utah State Prison not 
to exceed five years. Execution of the sentence was suspended 
and appellant was placed on probation for a period of eighteen 
months with a thirty day jail term and fined $1,ooo.oo. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
the verdict and judgment of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Undercover Officer Russell Spann of the Narcotics 
and Liquor Law Bureau, Department of Safety of the 
State of Utah (T. 45) met appellant at a beer-keg party at 
appellant's residence on June 19, 1981 in Carbonville, Utah 
(T. 46) Officer Spann had been invited by appellant's roommate 
earlier that evening while they were at the Comic Book Lounge 
in Helper, Utah, (T. 55) and arrived at the party around 
midnight to join approximately thirty other guests (T. 56). 
While at the party, Office Spann was asking people whether 
they had any marijuana, cocaine or LSD to sell (T. 58). 
During this conversation, appellant asked Spann if 
Spann could offer him a job at various oil fields (T. 60). 
Although Spann was posing as an oil field laborer, he did not 
either offer appellant a job or promise to help appellant find 
a job (T. 75). In response to Spann's request for a bag of 
marijuana, appellant "told him it was too late; I didn't know 
where to get one that time of night, anyway, for sure. But I 
was drunk and I did tell him I could probably find one the 
next morning if he wanted to come back." (T. 114-15). 
Officer Spann returned to appellant's residence the 
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next morning but no one was home (T. 62) .1 
Officer Spann had no further contact with appellant 
(T. 63) until 2:05 p.m. on July 1, 1981. Spann arrived at 
appellants' residence with Officer Mike Kagie of the West 
Valley Police Department (T. 76) and Patricia Hall of the Utah 
State Narcotics Division (T. 83). Neither Spann, Kagie or 
Hall had notified appellant of their visit (T. 70,80,86). 
Spann explained to appellant that they were on their way to 
Monticello, Utah and had just dropped by to see how appellant 
was doing (T. 47). 
Appellant invited the three undercover officers to 
come into his house and smoke a joint (T. 47). Officers Hall 
and Kagie sat on a couch in the livingroom (T. 77, 84) as 
Spann followed appellant into the kitchen (T. 48). Appellant 
picked up a cookie sheet type pan, a sifter and went to the 
flour bin from which he pulled out a half pound of marijuana 
(T. 48). While in the kitchen, Spann asked appellant "if he 
knew of anybody who had marijuana to sell of if he had any 
marijuana to sell" (T. 48-49). Appellant replied that he did 
and asked how much Spann wanted. Spann answered, "A bag" 
meaning an ounce. (T. 48-49). 
Returning to the livingroom, appellant rolled two 
joints which were passed around (T. 49, 78, 84). At 2:23 p.m. 
l Appellant remembered seeing Spann the morning after the 
party but could not remember going to bed ( T. 120) or whether 
or not he had gone to Salt Lake (T. 121) as he later told 
Officer Spann (T. 63)). 
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appellant asked Spann, "DO you still want one?" (T. 49) Spann 
asked the price (T. 49). Appellant stated the price at $50, 
to which Spann agreed (T. 49, 78, 84). 
Appellant left for the kitchen, returned through the 
livingroom into a small side room and came back carrying a 
cardboard box containing scales ( T. 49, 78-79, 85). In the 
kitchen, appellant measured out approxiamtely an ounce of 
marijuana (T. S2) and took $SO from Officer Spann (T. 49, 79). 
After this exchange, Spann inquired whether 
appellant could either sell or help him buy a pound or half 
pound of marijuana (T. SO). Appellant said that he usually 
had a pound on hand, but did not have the quantity at that 
time (T. SO, 63). But being familiar with the county, 
appellant claimed to know where one could be obtained and that 
Spann should contact him again when wanting to purchase more 
marijuana (T. SO, 63). 
Officers Spann, Hall and Kagie then left appellant's 
residence. An arrest warrant for appellant was issued on 
December 4, 1981. 
Appellant testified that at the June 19 party, agent 
Spann agreed to "keep an eye open and stop back in and let me 
know if he heard there was anything open or anything he could 
help me out with." (T. 114). 
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ARGUMENT ----
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY ON THE LEGAL STANDARD FOR ENTRAPMENT. 
Appellant contends that Jury Instruction #6 on 
Entrapment constituted prejudicial error because (a) the 
instruction required that the police conduct "would be 
effective" rather than "would create a substantial risk" of 
the offense being committed, and (6) the "average person" 
language of the instruct ion raised the standard of entrapment 
in violation of statutory definitions making it harder for the 
appellant to prove entrapment. 
Entrapment is an affirmative defense as defined in 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303 (1)(1953), as amended. 
It is a defense that the actor was 
entrapped into committing the offense. 
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement 
officer or a person directed by or acting 
in co-operation with the officer induces 
the commission of an offense in order to 
obtain evidence of the commission for 
prosecution by methods creating a 
substantial risk that the offense would be 
committed by one not otherwise ready to 
commit it. Conduct merely affording a 
person an opportunity to commit an offense 
does not constitute entrapment. 
Jury Instruciton #6 explained entrapment as: 
The Defendant in this case is asserting 
the defense of entrapment. Entrapment 
occurs when a law enforcement officer or a 
person directed by or acting in 
cooperation with the officer induces the 
commission of an offense in order to 
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( R. 32). 
obtain evidence of the commission for 
prosectuion by methods creating a 
substantial risk that the offense would be 
committed by one not otherwise ready to 
commit it. Conduct merely afording [sic] 
a person an opportunity to commit an 
offense does not constitute entrapment. 
In assessing police conduct under the 
defense of entrapment, the test to 
determine an unlawful entrapment is 
whether a law enforcement official or an 
agent, in order to obtain evidence of the 
commission of an offense, induced the 
Defendant to commit such an offense by 
persuasion or inducement which would be 
effective to presuade [sic] an average 
person, other than one who was merely 
given the opportunity to commit the 
offense. 
The Defendant need not prove that 
entrapment occured [sic] to be entitled to 
a not guilty verdict; it is sufficient if 
there exists a reasonable doubt as to 
whether the offense committed was the 
product of the Defendant's voluntary will 
or desire, or was induced by the 
persistent requests or other inducive 
conduct of the officer in this case; and 
if there is such a reasonable doubt when 
you should find the Defendant not guilty. 
Appellant's first contention stresses the "would be 
effective" language from the second paragraph of Instruction 
#6. Jury instructions are not to be considered in isolation, 
but as a whole. State v. Ruben, Utah, 663 P.2d 445 (1983). 
State v. Coffey, Utah, 564 P.2d 777 (1977); State v. Crisola, 
21 Utah 2d 272, 444 P.2d 517 (1968). Considered as a whole, 
the purpose of the second paragraph of Instruction #6 was to 
explain the objective standard of entrapment adopted in State 
v. Taylor, Utah, 599 P.2d 496 (1979). The emphasis of the 
second paragraph is the standard of police conduct, not the 
degree of risk or probability of effect. The first paragraph 
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of Instruction #6 clearly states the statutory description of 
"methods creating a substantial risk that the offense would be 
committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it." Utah Code 
Ann.§ 76-2-303(1), Instruction #6 (R. 32). The jury was 
instructed clearly that police methods need only create a 
substantial risk that the offense would be committed by a 
person not otherwise ready to commit it for there to be 
entrapment and therefore the instant instruction adhered to 
the statutory standard. 
Appellant's second claim finds fault with the 
"average person" language from the second paragraph of 
Instruction #6. Appellant argues that by focusing upon the 
"average person" the trial court was imposing a more stringent 
burren on the defendant than is statutorily required. 
However, the jury instruction read as a whole clearly 
explained to the jurors the objective standard of entrapment 
adopted by this Court in State v. Taylor. 
Utah had traditionally adopted the subjective test 
of entrapment as exemplified in State v. Pacheco, 13 Utah 2d 
148, 369 P.2d 494, 496 (1962). The subjective test asked (1) 
whether the re was an inducement and ( 2) if so, whether the 
defendant showed any predisposition to commit the offense. 2 
2 The subjective test is adopted in Sorrells v. United 
States, 287 u.s. 435, 53 s.ct. 210, 77 L.Ed. 413 0932); see 
62 A.L.R. 3d 110, Anno.: Modern Status of the Law 
Concerning Entrapment to Commit Narcotics Offense--State Case, 
2(a), P. 114. 
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Although was construed initially as consistent 
with the enactment in 1973 76-2-301(1),3 this Court 
later recognized that the explicit wording of § 76-2-303(1) 
incorporates an objective standard of entrapment. State v. 
Taylor, Utah, 599 P.2d 496 (1979). 
The objective test focuses not on the predisposition 
of the defendant, but "on whether the police conduct revealed 
in the particular case falls below standards, to which common 
feelings respond, for the proper use of governmental power." 
Id. at 500. The test to determine an unlawful entrapment 
examines whether the officer "induced the defendant to commit 
such an offense by persuasion or inducement which would be 
effective to persuade an average person, other than one who 
was merely given the opportunity to commit the offense." Id. 
at 503. Examples of prohibited police conduct are "extreme 
pleas of desperate illness or appeals based primarily on 
sympathy, pity or close personal friendship or offers of 
inordinate sums of money." !aylor, at 503; Grossman v. State, 
457 P.2d 226-230 (Ak. 1969). 
Utah's statute on entrapment follows the format and 
objective theory set forth in 2.13(1) of the Model Penal 
Code, Proposed Official Draft (1962) and the alternative 
provision offered in Tentative Draft No. 9, § 2.10 Model Penal 
Code. Taylor at 502. The comments clearly stress that on the 
3 State v. Curtis, Utah, 542 P.2d 744, 746 (1975). 
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objective view of entrapement, "" mere offer to buy narcotics 
from someone without a predisposition to sell would not raise 
the defense unless the offer created a substantial risk of a 
sale by those who were not ready to commit the offense. 
Comments § 2.10 at 19. The police agent's offer to buy must 
create a substantial risk for one without the predisposition 
in order for entrapment to lie. 
Instruction #6 quotes directly the language adopted 
in !aylor at 503. Read as a whole, Instruction #6 adequately 
and accurately instructed the jury on the defense of 
entrapment. 
Although appellant does not argue on appeal that he 
presented sufficient evidence to prove entrapment, appellant 
was not entrapped on the facts of this case. Officer Spann's 
behavior was not of such a character as to create a 
substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one 
not otherwise ready to commit it. Appellant's response at the 
June 19 party was not a refusal to sell to Agent Spann but 
merely a statement of inconvenience or unavailability. on a 
routine follow-up without great emotional appeal or promises 
of employment, Agent Spann was invited into appellant's home 
and offered an ounce of marijuana. Appellant made 
representations of future sales in larger quantities. 
Appellant was not entrapped. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly instructed the i ut·y on the 
legal standard for entrapment under Utah Cnd<> Ann. 
§ 76-2-303(1) (1953), as amended. The objective theory of 
entrapment was adequately explained when the trial court spoke 
of police methods creating a substantial risk that the offense 
would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it. 
The jury instruction was a clear paraphrase of language from 
State v. Taylor, Utah, 599 P.2d 496 (1979) and this state's 
entrapment statute. Appellant's conviction should be 
affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY dated this of March, 1984. 
L. WILKINSO __ 
G / --
EPHEN MIKITA 
sistant Attorney General 
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